Industrial Espionage—Nebraska’s New Felony by Orr, Jeffrey L.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 45 | Issue 3 Article 14
1966
Industrial Espionage—Nebraska’s New Felony
Jeffrey L. Orr
University of Nebraska College of Law, jorr@jacobsenorr.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation





Industrial research is the backbone of this country's advanced
economy. Tomorrow's advancement in industrial strength de-
pends directly upon the success of today's research. In the United
States alone, industry will spend eighteen billion dollars on re-
search this year.2 Although the value of this research is unlim-
ited, many companies will never realize the full benefit of their
outlay of time, effort and capital because of industrial espionage.
It is estimated that losses in industrial research through espionage
will reach two billion dollars annually.3
1 This bill was introduced as L.B. 867 and will be cited as Nzn. REv.
STAT. §§ 28-548.01-.03 (Supp. 1965).
Sec. 1. As used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. Article shall mean any object, material, device or substance or
copy thereof, including any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample,
specimen, phototype, model, photograph, micro-organism, blueprint or
map;
2. Representing shall mean describing, depicting, containing, con-
stituting, reflecting or recording;
3. Trade secret shall mean the whole or any portion or phrase of
any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, for-
mula or improvement which is secret and of value; and a trade secret
shall be presumed to be secret when the owner thereof takes measures
to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those
selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes; and
4. Copy shall mean any facsimile, replica, photograph or other
reproduction of an article, and any note, drawing or sketch made of
or from an article.
Sec. 2. Any person who, with intent to deprive or withhold from
the owner thereof the control of a trade secret, or with an intent to
appropriate a trade secret to his own use or to the use of another
(1) steals or embezzles an article representing a trade secret or
(2) without authority makes or causes to be made a copy of an
article representing a trade secret, shall be guilty of a felony and shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than one
thousand dollars, nor more than five thousand dollars, or by impri-
sonment in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for not less
than one year nor more than seven years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
Sec. 3. In a prosecution for a violation of the provisions of this
act it shall be no defense that the person so charged returned or
intended to return the article so stolen, embezzled or copied.
2 Hearings before the Banking, Commerce and Insurance Committee on




The theft of trade secrets4 is not a new problem in this coun-
try. One of the first American cases involving trade secrets was
Peabody v. Norfolk, 5 where the court held:
If he invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manu-
facture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not
indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against
those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a
property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one
who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes
to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third persons.6
That court went on to hold that injunctive relief would be granted
where there was irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy at
law. American courts have subsequently held that one who has
rightful possession of a trade secret has a property interest in the
subject of that secret.7 The property interest of the inventor or
discoverer is good against all except those who come by the secret
honestly or in good faith." Since the Peabody case, a body of
civil remedies has been developed to redress the injured party.
However, there has been very little development of criminal sanc-
tions specifically directed at trade thefts.
Increasing expenditures for research by American industry9
will undoubtedly encourage industrial espionage. Because of this
threat, legislators have become aware of the need for effective
criminal sanctions. New York was the first state to pass legisla-
tion specifically imposing criminal penalties on those guilty of
industrial espionage. 10 In 1965, the New Jersey Legislature passed
4 The most frequently quoted and generally accepted definition of "trade
secret" is set out in the RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 757, comment b at 5
(1939): "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who do not know or use it." See also, Macbeth-Evans Glass
Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688 (1913).
5 98 Mass. 452 (1867).
0 Id. at 458.
7 Stewart v. Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 369 (1903). See also Tabor v.
Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); Ferroline Corp. v. General
Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953).
8 Stewart v. Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 369 (1903).
9 25 billion dollars by 1970. Business Week, Oct. 6, 1962, p. 65.
10 N.Y. PEN. LAw, § 1296(4). The amended section reads as follows: "A
person is guilty of grand larceny in the second degree who, under
circumstances not amounting to grand larceny in the first degree, in
any manner specified in this article, steals or unlawfully obtains or
appropriates:
4) "Property of any value consisting of a sample, culture, micro-
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a bill setting out a detailed definition of "trade secret" and pre-
scribing the penalty for trade theft."
In accordance with Nebraska's "open-door policy" toward in-
dustry, the Nebraska Legislature passed an act in 1965 which
made the theft of a trade secret a felony.12 The act is an amal-
gamation of the New York and New Jersey acts.' 3 The question
toward which this article is directed is whether established civil
remedies, coupled with the added criminal sanctions, afford ade-
quate protection for industrial trade secrets in Nebraska. It is
therefore necessary to briefly discuss the battery of common law
civil remedies before considering the effects of the new legislative
provisions.
II. SUMMARY OF CIVIL REMEDIES
One injured by the dispossession or the deprivation of the
effective use of his trade secret may seek one or more civil rem-
edies to redress his loss. These remedies include injunction,1 4
accounting for profits,15 return of the stolen materials, 16 destruc-
tion of the products of the misappropriated secrets,'1 and suit for
damages.'8 The injunction was one of the earliest remedies used
to prevent wrongdoers from using illegally obtained trade se-
crets.' 9 In addition to injunctive relief, an injured party often
organism, specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any
other article, material, device or substance which constitutes, rep-
resents, evidences, reflects, or records a secret scientific or technical
process, invention or formula or any phase or part thereof. A proc-
ess, invention or formula is secret when it is not, and is not intended
to be available to anyone other than the owner thereof or selected
persons having access thereto for limited purposes with his consent,
and when it accords or may accord the owner an advantage over
competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or the ben-
efit thereof."
11 N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:119-5.1-.5 (Supp. 1965).
12 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-548.01-.03 (Supp. 1965).
13 1965 Hearings 4-26.
14 Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).
15 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 542, 73 Atl.
603 (1909).
16 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 AUt.
4 (1904).
'7 American Bell Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 Fed. 521 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
18 Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st. Dep't
1946).
19 STORY, COmmENTARiEs ON EQurrY, § 952 (2d ed. 1839); Peabody v.
Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1867).
LEGISLATIVE NOTE
would ask for damages, 20 the measure being not what the plain-
tiff lost because of the theft, but rather the benefit, profit or
advantage gained by the defendant through the use of the trade
secret.21 The advantage enjoyed by the defendant is measured by
the standard comparison method.22 In a case involving wrongful
use of an unpatented trade secret by a confidential disclosee, or
other person, the rightful possessor is entitled to an accounting
and recovery of the profits.23  One of the remedies that may be
requested, but is seldom granted, is destruction of the encroaching
property.24 The main reason for the court's reluctance in grant-
ing such relief is because of the economic waste involved. The
injured party not only has remedies against the person who took
or disclosed his trade secret, but may also sue for damages or ex-
ercise other remedies against a third person who knowingly takes
advantage of the misappropriation. 25  There are many complexi-
ties that arise from the employee-employer relationship and also
from the employer-employee-third party relationship, which are
outside the scope of this article.26
20 In Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342
(E.D. La. 1955) the court said: "Even where it cannot be said that
the parties stand in confidential relations, improper acquisition of
another's business information or trade secrets subjects the perpetrator
to liability in damages. And a court of equity will enjoin the use of
the business information or trade secrets so obtained." Id. at 355.
(Citations Omitted.)
21 International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696 (3d
Cir. 1957).
22 This method contemplates the comparison of the cost advantage to the
defendant as a result of the use of the trade secret and the method of
accomplishing the same result which would have been open to the
defendant had he not appropriated the trade secret. Ibid.
23 Becher v. Contoure Lab., 29 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1928), affd,, 279 U.S. 388
(1929).
24 American Bell Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 Fed. 521 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888). In
discussing the possibility of destruction the court held: "Where the
court has power to decree, necessarily it has power to carry its decree
into effectual execution; and a court which does not hesitate to enforce
its process by attachment and imprisonment of the person, and by
sequestration of the property of parties, in order to compel obedience,
would not hesitate from any consideration of want of power or pro-
priety to order property to be destroyed which has been created in
defiance of the rights of another, and is being used in further en-
croachment upon such rights, whenever it might be essential to the
ends of justice that this should be done." Id. at 523.
25 Jerrold-Stephens Co. v. Gustaveson, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Mo.
1956); Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp.
342 (E.D. La. 1955); Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp.,
207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953).
26 The employer-employee relationship most generally involves either an
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It therefore becomes clear that one who has been injured by
the theft of his trade secret is not without remedies to compensate
his loss. The problem, however, goes beyond mere compensation
to whether a wrongdoer should be exonerated by merely apolo-
gizing or by returning goods or profits. This is the issue that the
Nebraska Legislature was attempting to resolve when they en-
acted NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-548.01-.03 (Supp. 1965).
III. NEBRASKA LEGISLATION-CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS
The prosecution in trade theft cases under the current larceny
statutes is faced with two major problems. First, whether a
property interest in a trade secret is the same as "property" de-
fined in the larceny statutes.27 Secondly, the necessity of placing
a value on a piece of scrap paper, drawing, photostat, microfilm,
or reproduced blueprint.
In an attempt to avoid prosecution, the accused will claim as
a defense that what was taken was not property, but only a copy
or photostat of the original. It is unclear whether a copy or
photograph of an original is "property" in the same sense that
"property" is defined in the Nebraska statutes.28
The ascertainment of a monetary value is quite difficult in
many instances. Generally, the only value, which is necessary to
determine the degree of the crime, is the actual value of the paper
itself.29 The crime then falls within the purview of the petit lar-
expressed or implied contract of employment. This relationship re-
mains unaffected by the Nebraska act; however, employees fall within
the purview of the statute unrestricted by their status as an employee.
27 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-506 and § 28-512 (Reissue 1964).
28 Ibid. The Nebraska Supreme Court has not to date been faced with
this decision. This very likely could be due to the fact that most
charges are for petit larceny and few if any are appealed. However,
in a civil action for the recovery of profits, the court held that an
author did not have a common law property interest in his composi-
tion. A property interest would vest in the author when he complied
with the federal copyright laws. State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb.
752, 110 N.W. 763 (1906).
29 Generally, the trade secret does not have a market value, because it
was being developed for use by the researcher. Most theft statutes
refer to the fair market value when setting value out as the critera
for classification. The Nebraska courts have not clearly stated the
basis used in determining value; however, they appear to use the fair
market value. Spreitzer v. State, 155 Neb. 70, 50 N.W. 2d 516 (1951);
Brooks v. State, 28 Neb. 389, 44 N.W. 436 (1889); Gettinger v. State,
13 Neb. 308, 14 N.W. 403 (1882).
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cency statute,30 which imposes a maximum penalty of five hun-
dred dollars or six months imprisonment or both. In order for the
crime to fall within the grand larceny statute, the value of the
article stolen must be worth one hundred dollars or more.31
The Nebraska act is directed toward resolving both of the
aforementioned problems.32  The act sets out an extensive defini-
tion of trade secret and requires only that the article stolen be
of value in order for the theft to be classified as a felony. The
definition makes clear that a copy, photograph or even a scrap of
paper, if representative of a trade secret, is sufficient to meet the
requisite property requirement for conviction. Prior to its pas-
sage, theft of a trade secret in Nebraska would generally be clas-
sified as a petit larceny offense.33 By requiring the article to be
merely of value rather than a fixed or minimum sum, in order to
determine degree, the theft of a trade secret is punishable as a
felony.
The proponents of the Nebraska act felt that the penalty
provision would act as a strong deterrent to future trade secret
thefts.34 Criminal convictions attract more attention than do civil
judgments, as civil actions very seldom "make the front page" in
our newspapers. Therefore, a conviction for a felony would at-
tract more publicity and would serve as a warning to others con-
templating the theft of trade secrets. The individuals involved in
most trade secret cases are not typical mobsters, but are well-
educated white collar workers and executives. United Press Inter-
national reported a case in point:
Plump, balding Roberf Sancier Aries led a comfortable life.
Respected as a scientist, he was -listed in Who's Who. But then
a U.S. Drug firm realized that someone had stolen a $6 million
formula and peddled it around the world. Merck & Co. hurried
to Europe .... Late last year, a federal district judge pondered
the evidence and ruled that Aries, holder of two Ph.D. degrees,
high honors graduate of Yale, former consultant to banks, corpo-
rations and, the U.S. Government, member of the New York
Academy of Science, the American Institute of Chemists and the
Westchester, N.Y. Country Club, had* stolen the formula for a
poultry disease from Merck.35
The potential monetary value of the secret to the thief is a key
30 NEE. REV. STAT. § 28-512 (Reissue 1964).
31 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-506 (Reissue 1964).
32 1965 Hearings 1.
33 Ibid.
34 1965 Hearings.
35 The Sunday Oregonian, March 28, 1965, p. 16, col. 1.
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factor in negating the deterrent effect, if any, in criminal sanc-
tions. An individual in Dallas was not deterred by a possible
ten-year sentence when he stole computer programs from Texas
Instruments, Inc. The computer programs, which the company
had difficulty establishing a fifty dollar value for prosecution
purposes, were offered to Texaco, Inc. for five million dollars.86
The Nebraska act does overcome the problem of determining
value and property interest, but seemingly does not cover many
acts of industrial espionage. It requires physical removal of an
"article" in order to come within the statute's purview.3 7 An
industrial spy, who physically removes nothing but gains vast
knowledge of the competitor's organization and operation, would
be outside of the act. For example, a janitor who is actually a
technical expert planted in a competitive firm, telephoning infor-
mation out at night without physically removing property would
be outside the scope of the act. There are other instances which
present more difficult questions, such as the purchasing of waste
paper from a company's custodial help or from garbage collectors
and later fitting the scraps of information together like a puzzle.
Problems are also raised when key employees are pirated away
by competitive firms. A 1959 survey of 1,558 executives by the
Harvard Business Review 38 revealed some alarming trends in
business ethics. The report indicated that twelve percent of cor-
porate executives reported that their respective companies re-
ceived competitive information through the hiring of competitor's
employees. Over seventy-eight percent of these executives felt
their companies were entitled to all abilities and key knowledge
possessed by the new employees. Companies avoid prosecuting
employees who are discovered to be thieves, because the compan-
ies do not want bad publicity nor do they want to risk a damage
suit if the alleged thief is not convicted. As a consequence, fear
of prosecution is diminished because the employee is aware of the
company's reluctance to prosecute. 39
This is a difficult area in which to legislatively protect the
employer because there are equally important policy reasons for
protecting the mobility of the labor force. Perhaps it is best to
leave the problem of employee disclosure to the private contrac-
tual relationship of employee-employer. 40
36 State v. Hancock, No. E-9167-IK, D. Tex., Sept. 3, 1965.
37 Supra notes 30 and 31.
38 Business Week, Nov. 21, 1959, p. 114.
39 BRENTON, THE PRIVAcY INVADERS, 97 (1964).
40 This would be so, as long as the employee did not fall within the
purview of the Nebraska act, i.e., physically removing "articles" rep-
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IV. UNIFORM LEGISLATION
In recent years there have been attempts to draft uniform
legislation in the trade secret field. The Committee on Trade-
marks and Unfair Competition of the New York City Bar Asso-
ciation drafted a Federal Unfair Commercial Activities Act,
41
which included theft of trade secrets under the general heading
of unfair commercial activity. The act was introduced in Con-
gress in 1959,42 but was never passed. The Judiciary Committee
is presently considering a bill which would prohibit the interstate
transportation of stolen trade secrets. 43 This provision would
amend the Stolen Property Act.44 The proposed draft is sub-
stantially similar to the Nebraska act.
V. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska act will not provide complete protection for
an owner of a trade secret, but it certainly affords far greater
protection than was previously available. The bill negates many
of the hollow defenses formally used by industrial spys. No
longer will an accused have the defense that what he took was
only a copy or photograph and therefore was not property. Nor
can a person charged assert as a defense that the "article" has
been returned or that he intended to return it. Section three of
the Nebraska act specifically voids this defense.45  The prosecu-
tion is no longer burdened with the often impossible task of
establishing fair market value of the article taken, as the act re-
quires only that the article be "secret" and of "value". Although
the act should greatly aid the prosecution in obtaining convictions
in a majority of trade theft cases, more protection is needed.
There is need for comprehensive legislation which would cover
the individual who is placed in a competitive firm to remove
nothing but "ideas". The intent to "steal" and the injury to the
resenting trade secrets. The acts of the employee with regard to dis-
closure could and generally are included either expressly or impliedly
in contracts of employment. It is for the employer and employee to
establish the necessary protection for those acts which would fall out-
side the scope of the statutes.
41 Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw.
U.L. REv. 437 (1960).
42 H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
43 H.R. 5578, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). No hearings have been held
and none are scheduled. There appears to be no comparable pro-
posal pending in the Senate.
44 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-17 (1964).
45 Supra note 1.
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owner are equally as great under these circumstances as in the
case where the article itself is removed. Both state and federal
agencies are aware of the need for legislation in the trade theft
area46 and if the recent interest is indicative of public concern,
the near future should experience more comprehensive legisla-
tion in this area.
Jeffrey L. Orr '67
46 Klein, supra note 41.
